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Are the Elderly Really
Over-Annuitized?




It is well established in the economics literature that annuities ought to
be of substantial value to life-cycle consumers who face an uncertain date
of death. Yaari (1965) proved that a life-cycle consumer with an uncertain
lifetime and no bequest motives would ﬁnd 100 percent annuitization the
optimal investment. More recent work has quantiﬁed the potential utility
gains to such a life-cycle consumer. For example, a sixty-ﬁve-year-old male
life-cycle consumer would be willing to give up nearly one-third of his
wealth to gain access to an actuarially fair market for annuities (Mitchell
et al. 1999).
Buying a life insurance contract is analogous to selling an annuity. Life
insurance is generally viewed as an appropriate product for working-age
individuals who seek to protect their families against the loss of future
labor earnings (Lewis 1989). However, it appears to serve little purpose in
the portfolio of a retired life-cycle consumer whose sole concern is self-
ﬁnancing retirement out of his or her accumulated wealth. With no labor
earnings to insure, an elderly individual should be purchasing annuities in
order to provide a certain consumption stream in retirement, not selling
annuities through the purchase of life insurance. Even if the individual
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91wishes to leave a portion of wealth to his or her heirs in the form of gifts
or bequests, this can be achieved by investing this portion of wealth in
ordinary bonds or other non-annuitized assets. In fact, if life insurance
premiums were higher than actuarially fair, holding riskless bonds would
dominate life insurance as a form of wealth transfer.
Yet elderly households in the United States overwhelmingly hold life
insurance, while only a small fraction hold privately purchased annuity
contracts. In the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) survey, which consists of households aged seventy and older,
privately purchased annuity contracts (excluding private pensions) are
held by fewer than 8 percent of couples, while 78 percent of couples age
seventya nd older own a life insurance policy on at least one member.
According to the Life Insurance Ownership Study (Life Insurance Market
Research Association [LIMRA] 1993), ownership of individual (non-
group) life insurance policies is actually higher among the group aged
sixty-ﬁve and older than any other age cohort. While this diﬀerence is
oﬀsetb ym uchl ower coverage by group (usually employer-based) policies,
the overall incidenceo fc overage among the elderly is quite high by any
measure.
Two major alternative hypotheses have been explored in the literature
to explain the patterns of life insurance coverage among the elderly. Auer-
bach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 1989) explored the idea that married couples
use life insurance to reallocate annuity streams across survival states of
the couple. However, they found virtually no support for the notion that
older households were using life insurance to protect potential widows and
widowers against severe drops in living standards upon the death of the
other spouse.
Thes econdh ypothesis, suggested by Bernheim (1991), is that life insur-
ance is being held by elderly households to oﬀset ane x c e s s ive level of
mandated annuitization in the form of Social Security. He estimates that
25 percent of elderly households have too much of their wealth annuitized
and that they are using term life insurance to sell these annuities in order
to leaveab equest. To the extent that this “annuity oﬀsetm odel” is true,
it has at least two important implications. First, this would be indicative
of very strong bequest motives, which is an issue of perennial controversy
in the economics literature (e.g., Kotlikoﬀ and Summers 1981; Modigliani
1988; Hurd 1987; Laitner and Juster 1996). Second, if individuals are over-
annuitized due to these strong bequest motives, this would indicate a po-
tential welfare gain from lessening the extent of the mandated annuitiza-
tion.T his is potentially important in the debate about whether individuals
would be required to annuitize individual account accumulations as part
of ar eformed Social Security system. If a signiﬁcant fraction of house-
holds are over-annuitized, allowing individuals some discretion over the
disposition of the assets in their individual accounts could be welfare en-
hancing.
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better data than were available for the original empirical tests. The four
empirical implications of the model that this paper tests are (1) that no
individual would hold both term life insurance and private annuities, (2)
that the level of Social Security beneﬁts and term life insurance ownership
should be negatively correlated, (3) that term life insurance should behave
as an inferior good because it is a negative annuity and annuities are nor-
mal goods, and (4) that individuals who hold term life insurance must
have a Social Security beneﬁt in excess of desired retirement consumption.
These implications will be explained in more detail in the next section. This
paper presents results that are inconsistent with all four of these empirical
implications, and thus concludes that life insurance coverage is not ag o o d
indicator of the extent of over-annuitization.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 summarizes the annuity oﬀ-
setm odel as posited by Bernheim (1991), and outlines the empirical impli-
cations of the model to be tested. Section 3.3 presents and critiques the
empirical results from the previous literature, with particular attention on
the distinction between types of life insurance. Section 3.4 discusses the
data used in this paper, from the AHEAD study. Section 3.5 presents em-
pirical results. Section 3.6 discusses some alternative explanations for life
insurance holdings among the elderly, and section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The Annuity Oﬀset Model of Life Insurance Demand
Theb asic insight behind of the annuity oﬀsetm odel of life insurance
demand is that individuals can purchase term life insurance in order to sell
ag overnment mandated annuity. Bernheim suggests a simple two-period
model that demonstrates this point. Assume that an individual possesses
total wealth W0,w hich the individual is able to divide between two types
of investments. It is assumed that the investment decision is taking place
after consumption in period 0 has already occurred. The ﬁrst type of asset,
A,i salife-contingent annuity contract that yields a return of  in period
1i fthe individual is alive, and 0 otherwise. The second type of asset, B,i s
at raditional (bequeathable) ﬁnancial asset that yields a return of  in
period 1 regardless of whether the individual is alive. If the individual lives,
his or her period 1 resources are W1  A  B.I fthe individual dies, his
or her heirs receive B.B ecause actuarially fair annuities pay a “mortality
premium” equal to the probability of dying,  .U t ility of the individ-
ual is assumed to be a function of total resources and bequeathable re-
sources in period 1, U  U(B, W1). Call A*a n dB* the quantities of the
two assets that correspond to the optimal division of total wealth, subject
to the constraint that W0  A  B.
Now suppose the government conﬁscates Ag in period 0 and returns Ag
in period 1, conditional on the individual’s survival. In other words, the
government mandates a minimum level of annuitization. If Ag  A*, then
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an amount equal to Ag,o ralternatively, the individual buys private annu-
ities in the amount of A*  Ag.I fAg  A*, then the individual wishes to
sell annuities. This can be done through the purchase of a term life insur-
ance contract. When markets for annuities and life insurance are actuari-
ally fair, then the government mandate has no eﬀecto nthe individual’s
division of wealth between A and B.P rivate insurance contracts oﬀset the
government annuity dollar for dollar. If insurance is not actuarially fair,
then the oﬀseti sless than dollar for dollar, but the basic story is un-
changed. Individuals who wish to hold more annuities than the govern-
ment mandates will own private annuity contracts. Individuals who wish
to hold less in annuities will own private life insurance contracts. No indi-
vidual will hold both private annuities and life insurance, since they are
oﬀsetting transactions, each with a positive load factor. Some individuals
will hold neither, if Ag is suﬃciently close to A*.
There are four major empirical implications that must hold if the annu-
ity oﬀsetm odel is the reason that the elderly hold life insurance. These are
as follows.
1. No individual will hold both private annuities and private term life in-
surance contracts. Given the existence of signiﬁcant load factors in annuity
markets (Mitchell et al. 1999), no one would rationally purchase annuities
above the actuarial cost only to sell them back below the actuarial cost.
2. An increase in the level of the mandated annuity will increase the de-
mand for term life insurance. Recall that an individual will hold term life
insurance in the amount of max{0, Ag  A*}.H o lding W0 ﬁxed, an in-
crease in Ag will increase the total amount of life insurance coverage
among those who already hold it. It will also cause some individuals who
did not hold life insurance before to purchase it.
3. Term life insurance will behave as an inferior good. If B and W1 are
normal goods, then an increase in the individual’s total resources will in-
crease the demand for annuities. This is because a person with more re-
sources will wish to buy more annuities in order to increase retirement
consumption. Since term life insurance is a negative annuity, an increase
in the demand for annuities corresponds to a decrease in the demand for
term life insurance. Therefore, term life insurance will decline with total
resources, and thus behave as an inferior good.
4. The Social Security annuity income ﬂow must exceed consumption for
life insurance owners. If an individual is over-annuitized due to bequest
motives, it must be because his or her desired consumption is less than
the annuity income from Social Security. So long as optimal consumption
exceeds the level of the Social Security beneﬁt, there is no need to oﬀset
Social Security. Rather, one would want to supplement Social Security
through the purchase of private annuities. An equivalent way to state this
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annuity will not consume out of his or her non–Social Security resources.
Thei ndividual will save these resources for bequests, and will in fact sup-
plement this bequest with the term life insurance.
It should be noted some of the reasons an individual might be over-
annuitized have nothing to do with bequest motives. Hurd (1987) points
out that when an individual’s optimal consumption path is constrained by
an exogenously given annuity stream, he or she may be willing to give up
annuitization at an actuarially fair rate in order to loosen this liquidity
constraint. This is especially likely if the individual has little nonannuitized
wealth. However, over-annuitization in this case is driven by a desire to
reallocate consumption across one’s lifetime, not to reallocate between
consumption and bequests. Another example is the case in which an indi-
vidual wishes to hold a buﬀer stock of assets to cover unforeseen expendi-
ture shocks (e.g., health expenditures). In such a situation, the individual
may wish to hold some of his or her wealth in a nonannuitized form. Once
again, the role of the nonannuitized wealth in this case is still to provide
foro wn consumption, not to leave a bequest to one’s heirs. In this case,
the way to undo the excessive annuitization, however, is not to purchase
life insurance, since these proceeds will be unavailable for future consump-
tion.R a ther, the individual would wish to purchase insurance against the
riskyf uture event (e.g., health insurance) or alter his or her saving behavior
in order to provide for a buﬀer stock. The tests that I propose in this paper
arem eant to test for over-annuitization that derives from bequest motives,
not these other factors.
3.3 Discussion of Previous Empirical Results and Data Contamination
Bernheim tested the ﬁrst three implications of the annuity oﬀsetm odel
using the 1975 cross-section of the Retirement History Survey (RHS), and
found support for two of them. The most robust ﬁnding was that higher
Social Security beneﬁts were correlated both with a higher probability of
owning life insurance, and with the amount of coverage conditional on
owning a policy. His interpretation of this ﬁnding is that individuals are
using the life insurance to oﬀset excessive levels of Social Security. He
also found some evidence to suggest that life insurance coverage was a
decreasing function of lifetime resources, which is consistent with the “in-
ferior good” implication, though this ﬁnding was not robust across speci-
ﬁcations.
The ﬁrst implication, that no person would hold both life insurance and
annuities, was clearly at odds with the data, because 36 percent of the
RHS sample reported both in-force life insurance holdings and the receipt
of pension annuities. He attributes this latter result to data contamination,
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term life insurance. Because much of Bernheim’s analysis was focused on
trying to overcome this data handicap, it is useful to discuss the types of
life insurance in more detail.
3.3.1 Term versus Whole Life Insurance
The distinction between term and whole life insurance is quite important
to the annuity oﬀsetm odel. The diﬀerence between the two policy types
is quite simple, but has important economic implications. Term life insur-
ance contracts provide insurance protection for a speciﬁed limited period.
The face amount of the policy is payable to the beneﬁciaries only if the
insured dies within the term speciﬁed. Common term periods include one-
year, ﬁve-year, ten-year, and twenty-year. Most term policies have options
allowing an individual to guarantee renewability at the end of the term
speciﬁed. This means that an individual is not at risk for losing coverage
if he or she is diagnosed with a serious health problem, so long as he or
she pays the contract premium. Because the price of a term insurance
contract is a function of the probability of the individual’s dying during
that term, premiums are an increasing function of the insured’s age.
Whole life policies, on the other hand, are not limited in duration, but
rather protect “the whole of life” (Graves 1994). Unlike term insurance
contracts, which represent pure insurance, the typical whole life contract
is a combination of insurance and tax-deferred savings. The typical “ordi-
nary life” product has ﬁxed- (nominal) level premiums and a ﬁxed (nomi-
nal) death beneﬁt or face value. As demonstrated in ﬁgure 3.1, the cash
values of these policies rise over time, while the pure insurance component
declines. The standard practice among life insurers is for the cash value to
equal the face value by age ninety-ﬁve or 100 (Graves 1994). According
to the 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the median whole life
insurance policy held by individuals aged seventy and up had a cash value
that was 67 percent of the face value. This means that only one-third of
the reported face value of whole lifep olicies represents insurance. Most
whole life policies have provisions that enable the individual to borrow
against the cash value of his or her policy, and thus provide some degree
of liquidity. Importantly for the annuity oﬀsetm odel, the cash value of a
policy is not a negative annuity, but rather represents a nonannuitized ﬁ-
nancial asset, much like a saving account. While it is true that the cash
value of a life insurance policy may be left to one’s heirs as a bequest, a
large cash value policy would not be indicative of over-annuitization any
more than would the holding of a large savings account.
As important as this distinction may be between term and whole life
insurance, previous empirical work on the elderly was unable to distin-
guish between them. The RHS provided data only on the total face value
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life more closely resembles tax-deferred savings than it does insurance,
previous researchers were unable to disentangle these two potentially dif-
ferenteﬀects.Forexample,supposehigh-incomeindividualsaremorelikely
topurchase whole life insurance as a form of tax-deferred savings. Because
these individuals are high income, they also receive ah i gher Social Secu-
rity beneﬁt at retirement. This could lead to a spurious correlation between
total life insurance holdings and the level of the Social Security beneﬁts.
As we shall see, this commingling of insurance and tax deferred savings
has an important impact on the results.
3.3.2 Group versus Individual Coverage
Another relevant distinction between types of life insurance that may
be important to this model is between group and individual coverage.
Group life insurance policies are commonly provided through employers
or unions. An example of a typical group life policy is one that insures an
employee for a ﬁxed multiple of his or her salary. Individual contracts, on
the other hand, are purchased directly from the insurance company, most
often through an insurance agent or broker.
Thep r imary distinction between these policies is that individual life
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Fig. 3.1 Proportion of saving and insurance elements in an ordinary whole life
insurance contract
Source: Graves (1994)
Note: Calculated based on issue age of twenty-ﬁve using 1980 Commissioners Standard Ordi-
nary female lifetable and a 4.5 percent rate of interest.coverage is clearly a “choice” variable, whereas group coverage is often
automatic with employment. While in many instances group coverage
simply substitutes for individual coverage that would have been purchased
anyway, it will also cover some individuals who may have chosen to hold
no life insurance if not covered through their employer. Another reason
this distinction is relevant is that, since group coverage is usually tied to
employment, its purpose is often to protect an employee’s family from the
loss of future earnings. This purpose for holding life insurance is distinctly
diﬀerent from using life insurance to oﬀsetar e t irement annuity.
Groupc overage is less common among retired elderly households, since
most group coverage is tied to employment. Neither the RHS, nor the
AHEAD data used in this study, allow for this distinction between group
and individual coverage. However, by making use of information about
the current employment status of an individual, it is possible to extract
some information about the eﬀects of this diﬀerence.
3.3.3 Previous Empirical Results
Previous empirical support of the annuity oﬀsetm odel rests on two key
results. The ﬁrst is that there exists a strong positive correlation in a cross-
section of households between the level of Social Security beneﬁts and
the holdings of life insurance. Bernheim estimates that approximately 25
percent of households own term life insurance, and based on his model,
are therefore over-annuitized. His central results indicate that they are us-
ing term insurance to oﬀset Social Security by roughly twenty cents on
the dollar.
Second, Bernheim ﬁnds mixed evidence to suggest that a portion of the
total life insurance holdings are negatively correlated with total lifetime
resources, and thus represents an inferior good. Importantly, in his most
direct speciﬁcations, he ﬁnds that life insurance coverage is actually in-
creasing with resources for married couples with children. Only when he
imposes more structure on the problem to overcome problems of data
contamination does he ﬁnd a consistently negative and signiﬁcant resource
eﬀect. However, this approach is unable to identify directly the eﬀect of
resources on term life insurance, and instead relies on modeling total hold-
ings as the sum of twos eparatep rocesses (one representing term and one
representing whole, but each unidentiﬁed in advance) and testing the sign
of various coeﬃcientc ombinations.
The diﬃculty with these results is that the potential for bias is quite high
due to the inability to identify directly the term insurance component of
total life insurance holdings. Suppose that individuals purchase insurance
during their working lives in order to protect their spouses and children
from the loss of their human capital in the event of an early death. Individ-
uals can choose between term and whole life insurance to meet this insur-
ance need. The annual premium on a whole life contract is higher than the
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essentially goes into a savings account that beneﬁts from tax-deferred in-
side buildup. Because of this, the whole life contract is more attractive, all
else equal, to an individual in a higher marginal tax bracket. Therefore,
high earners (who therefore face higher marginal rates) have the most to
gain from purchasing whole life contracts. High earners will also be paying
more in Social Security payroll taxes, and will thus have a higher beneﬁt
upon retirement. Thus, to the extent that whole life contracts held by the
elderly represent “residue” from decisions made early in life to protect
human capital, this would induce a spurious positive relationship between
Social Security beneﬁts (SSB) and whole life insurance coverage.
Two pieces of evidence suggest that this scenario is a strong possibil-
ity. First, according to a life insurance ownership study conducted by
LIMRA, the median age of the oldest life insurance policy held by individ-
uals aged seventy and up was forty-two years, suggesting that most policies
were in fact purchased during the individual’s working life. Second, there
is a clear positive relationship between ownership of whole life insurance
and income during one’s working life. For example, if we focus on working-
agei ndividuals (aged twenty-two to sixty-ﬁve) in the 1995 SCF, we ﬁnd
that only 20 percent of individuals with incomes under $30,000 own a
whole life insurance policy. Of those with annual incomes between $30,000
and $60,000, 33 percent own a whole life policy. Nearly half (48 percent)
of those earning over $60,000 per year own a whole life policy. This rela-
tionship is not biased by the age-earnings proﬁle, as a nearly identical
trend emerges when one examines ownership patterns conditional on age.
Thus, whole life insurance ownership during one’s working life is clearly
correlated with income, and thus with OASDI contributions. If individuals
continue to hold these policies after retirement, this will lead to a positive
correlation between the level of Social Security beneﬁts and whole life
insurance ownership. Newly available data allow for a separation of total
life insurance into whole versus term life policies, and as such provides a
more direct test of the model.
As econdp otential source of spurious correlation is that some individ-
uals in the Bernheim study were still in the work force. His 1975 RHS
sample was comprised of individuals aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine. Ac-
cording to Department of Labor statistics, in that year the labor force
participation rate of individuals aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine was 31.7 per-
cent.H ighl abor force participation can lead to bias in the annuity oﬀset
test for two reasons. First, individuals still in the workforce still have posi-
tive human capital to protect, and may hold life insurance for this reason.
If these individuals also have higher Social Security beneﬁts due to their
strong attachment to the labor force, this could induce a positive correla-
tion between beneﬁts and insurance coverage. Second, employed workers
arem ore likely to be automatically covered by group insurance plans.
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beinsured. If employed workers are more likely to have higher Social Secu-
rity beneﬁts, a spurious positive correlation would result.
3.4 Data and Methodology
This paper uses data on elderly households from the ﬁrst wave of the
AHEAD survey. Fielded in 1993–94, this survey collected detailed ﬁnan-
cial and demographic data on community-based individuals born in 1923
or earlier, so they were aged seventy and up at the date of the survey. The
questionnaire collects detailed information on economic and demographic
variables, health, work status, and importantly for this study, life insur-
ance coverage.
There are several advantages to the use of this data over the earlier work
completed using the RHS. First, the data allow for the important distinc-
tion between term life and whole life insurance coverage. While they still
do notp ermit the decomposition of whole life into its cash versus insur-
ance value, the fact that we can distinguish between pure term policies
and whole policies represents an important improvement over the total
face value of all insurance. Second, because the data consist of individuals
aged seventya nd up, nearly all of them are retired. This is important both
because this means that the individuals no longer carry life insurance to
protect against the loss of human capital, and because it is signiﬁcantly
less likely that the individual will be covered by a group life insurance plan
through the employer. Therefore, a test of the annuity oﬀset hypothesis
will not be contaminated by work-related reasons for insurance coverage.
Third, the data are much more recent than the RHS, which is potentially
important due to the clear long-term decline in the life insurance coverage
of households over the past three decades (LIMRA 1993). Fourth, be-
cause of the advanced age of the cohorts, there are large enough samples
to investigate the behavior of widows and couples separately. This may be
an important distinction because at least one alternative to the annuity
oﬀset hypothesis is relevant to couples but not to widows. This is the no-
tion that elderly couples may use life insurance to reallocate wealth across
states of spousal survival.
Thep r imary disadvantage of the AHEAD data is the fact that they do
not currently contain information on the earnings histories of respondents.
As a result, it will not be possible to replicate precisely the speciﬁcation
of lifetime resources as used in Bernheim’s work on this subject. However,
the information on current income from Social Security and pension plans
is quite detailed, and along with information on ﬁnancial assets it is pos-
siblet oc o nstruct a very good measure of resources available to the house-
hold from the date of the survey forward.
This analysis will focus on two subsets of households in the AHEAD
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viewed, and for which we therefore have complete information about im-
portant characteristics of both spouses. The second set consists of male
widowers and female widows (hereafter often referred to collectively as
widows), i.e., formerly married individuals who lost their spouses to death.
Excluded from this analysis are never married individuals, both because
of small sample sizes and because they are less likely to have children or
grandchildren to which they may wish to bequeath. Also excluded are
single divorcees, due to small sample sizes and the fact that the survey
lacks important information about their former spouses. The resulting
sample size for married couples ranges from 1,750 to 1,950 households,
and from 2,600 to 2,800 widows and widowers. The range of households
arises from missing data for some versions of the dependent variable. For
example, an individual may state that he or she does not own a whole life
policy, but that he or she does own a term life policy with an unknown
face value. My decision rule was to include the maximum number of
households possible, so this person would be included in the whole life
regressions, but excluded from the term life and total life regressions due
to missing data. I have conducted extensive checks to ensure that the re-
sults were not sensitive to this selection process, and found that the basic
results are unchanged.
In order to test for the eﬀect of Social Security beneﬁts and total re-
sources on the holdings of life insurance, I use the following econometric
speciﬁcation:
(1) LI max SSB LR ii i i i X =+ + + + {, } 0 01 2 3    ε
LI is the face value of life insurance. In some speciﬁcations, this will
represent total face value, while in others I will limit it to term life or whole
life only, in order to account for the cash value bias discussed earlier. SSB
represents the annual ﬂow of beneﬁts from Social Security. LR is a vector
of characteristics that attempts to capture components of lifetime re-
sources. It includes the variable PVR (present value of resources), which
equals the expected discounted present value of resources, including net
worth, social security wealth, and pension wealth. Because lifetime earn-
ings records are not yet available in the data set that I use, the LR vector
also includes a number of variables which proxy for the eﬀect of lifetime
earnings. These include nine occupation indicators and four educational
attainment indicators. For speciﬁcations involving couples, these indicator
variables are all included separately for each spouse. X is a vector of other
relevant demographic characteristics, including age, gender, race, and
whether the respondents have any living children.
I will show results using two diﬀerent estimation procedures. For com-
parability with Bernheim’s study, I will ﬁrst assume the normality of ε and
Are the Elderly Really Over-Annuitized? 101report results from a tobit speciﬁcation. One might be concerned about
the possibility of heteroscedasticity in the unobservables in the demand
for life insurance, which would render the tobit results inconsistent. There-
fore,Iwill also report results using simple ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions with White-corrected standard errors. As the results will indi-
cate, to the extent that heteroscedasticity biases the tobit results, it appears
to do so in a direction that favors the annuity oﬀsetm odel. Further speci-
ﬁcation checks using a censored least absolute deviations (LAD) estimator,
or modeling the heteroscedasticity in a multiplicative form, similarly indi-
cate that any such biases tend to work in favor of the annuity oﬀsetm odel.
This phenomenon is captured by the OLS estimates, so I limit reported
results to tobit and OLS.
Equation (1) closely approximates the main speciﬁcation used by Bern-
heim in his test of the annuity oﬀsetm odel in the RHS, with three primary
diﬀerences. The ﬁrst is that Bernheim was restricted to using total face
value of all life insurance as his dependent variable, whereas the current
study can examine whole and term separately. The second diﬀerence is in
the construction of the measure of total resources. The deﬁnition used
here, PVR, is net worth plus the present value of future income from Social
Security and pensions, and thus represents resources available from today
forward. Bernheim’s measure was the present value of lifetime earnings
plus the present value of Social Security and pensions, and thus repre-
sented total lifetime resources. The third diﬀerence is that the current study
examines behavior of widows and couples in separate regressions. Bern-
heim ran his model on all households, with appropriate indicators for mar-
ital status, but excluded individuals whoh ad been widowed more than
six years.
3.5 Results
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics on life insurance ownership
among households aged seventy and up in the AHEAD data. Several fea-
tures of the data are worth noting. First, men are more likely to hold all
types of life insurance than are women. Nearly 62 percent of widowed
men own a life insurance policy, versus only 49 percent of widowed
women. Among currently married couples, 72 percent of men are covered
by at least one policy, versus only 55 percent of married women. Looking
at term and whole life ownership separately, the same basic pattern
emerges, in that men are always more likely to hold insurance than women.
In addition, men always hold more insurance conditional on owning, than
do women.
As econdf eature of the data is that most policies tend to be quite small,
though the distribution is fairly skewed. The median married household
owns a total of $10,756 of life insurance, a ﬁgure that includes all types of
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smaller, with a median value of $5,000 for men, and $2,500 for women.
However, the means are roughly two to three times larger than the me-
dians, which is driven by the fact that a small fraction of households own
very large policies. For example, the 95th percentile of total household
coverage among married couples (conditional on owning) is $113,000. The
95th percentile of coverage for male widowers is $50,000.
The third broad pattern to recognize is that marital status is an impor-
tant margin along which insurance coverage diﬀers. Married individuals
arem uchm ore likely to own life insurance than are widows or widowers
of the same gender, and hold more of it conditional on owning. There are
many reasons that this could be true, including reasons that might bear
upon the relative importance of using life insurance to protect a spouse
versus providing a bequest. However, a large part of these diﬀerences is
undoubtedly attributable to diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial status of married
versus widowed households, which is not captured in these simple tabula-
tions.
3.5.1 Test of Implication no. 1: No Simultaneous Holdings
The ﬁrst implication of the annuity oﬀsetm odel, and the one easiest to
test in the data, is the notion that no individual would choose to hold life
insurance and annuities simultaneously. This is because they are oﬀsetting
transactions, each of which may cause the individual to incur transactions
costs due to the fact that private insurance markets are not actuarially fair.
This assumption is clearly violated by the data in table 3.2. This is par-
Table 3.1 Life Insurance Coverage in the AHEAD Data
Widows/widowers Married Couples
Men Women Men Women Household
Pr(Owns Any LI) 0.6184 0.4868 0.7176 0.5540 0.7791
Amount | Owns Any
Median ($) 5,000 2,500 9,000 3,000 10,756
Mean ($) 14,280 5,250 25,481 10,718 31,541
Pr(Owns Term LI) 0.3730 0.3310 0.4174 0.3014 0.4958
Amount | Owns Term
Median ($) 5,000 2,000 5,000 3,000 7,000
Mean ($) 9,028 3,841 12,238 7,564 15,313
Pr(Owns Whole LI) 0.2749 0.1505 0.4940 0.2577 0.5659
Amount | Owns Whole
Median ($) 6,000 3,000 10,000 4,500 14,000
Mean ($) 18,297 7,189 33,503 13,221 36,119
Source: Authors’ tabulations from AHEAD survey, using household weights.
Notes: PR(Owns LI) is the fraction reporting ownership of that life insurance contract type.
Amount | Owns LI is the mean or median policy size conditional on ownership.
Are the Elderly Really Over-Annuitized? 103ticularly notable if one follows the Bernheim approach of treating annu-
ities from pension plans as voluntarily purchased. Of all married house-
holds, 50 percent own both a private pension and some form of life
insurance. Among widows and widowers, 21 percent own both private
pension annuities and life insurance. There are reasons to suspect that
private pensions are not strictly voluntary, especially among those aged
seventy and up who were likely covered for most of their careers in tradi-
tional deﬁned beneﬁt plans. However, even if we restrict ourselves to pri-
vately purchased, nonpension annuities, 6.6 percent of married couples
ownb o th. Since only 7.7 percent of the sample own such an annuity, how-
ever, this means that 86 percent of those married households who have
purchased a private, nonpension annuity also own life insurance.
These numbers are not surprising, since in Bernheim’s own sample 36
percent of households, which included both married and widowed individ-
uals, owned both pensions and life insurance. He attributed this ﬁnding
to data contamination, namely the fact that he was unable to distinguish
between term and whole life insurance. If the 36 percent of people holding
both were really holding whole life policies with cash values approaching
their face values (i.e., they contained very little insurance), then this ﬁnd-
ing would not be inconsistent with the annuity oﬀsetm odel. However,
using the AHEAD data, we can see that this is not the explanation.
Roughly one-third of married households own both straight term life in-




Yes No Yes No
Married Couples (total household coverage)
Owns any life insurance
Yes .501 .278 .066 .713
No .093 .128 .011 .210
Owns term life insurance
Yes .332 .164 .038 .458
No .260 .244 .038 .466
Widows and Widowers
Owns any life insurance
Yes .211 .298 .030 .479
No .137 .354 .026 .465
Owns term life insurance
Yes .133 .192 .039 .309
No .216 .460 .017 .636
Source: Authors’ tabulations from AHEAD survey, using household weights.
Note: Proportion of population holding both products.
104 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nsurance policies and a private pension, as do 13 percent of widows. Per-
haps the purest test of the model is to use term life insurance and nonpen-
sion annuities. In this case, 3.8 percent of couples hold both. Importantly,
one-half of all married households that own a nonpension annuity also
have life insurance coverage. This is clearly inconsistent with the annuity
oﬀsetm odel.
3.5.2 Test of Implication no. 2: Positive Correlation
between Insurance and Social Security
Thes econd, and arguably the most important, implication of the annu-
ity oﬀseth ypothesis is that there should exist a positive correlation be-
tween term life insurance coverage and the level of SSB. The heart of this
hypothesis, as outlined in section 3.2, is that when individuals have higher
SSB, they want to buy fewer private annuities and more life insurance.
Table 3.3 reports tobit results for equation (1) in the combined sample
of widows and widowers. Column (1) reports tobit coeﬃcients for the case
in which total face value of all life insurance holdings (term plus whole) is
the dependent variable. Column (2) reports coeﬃcients for the OLS speci-
ﬁcation.C o lumns (3) and (4) repeat this analysis with the dependent vari-
ablelimited to term life insurance, and columns (5) and (6) limit the depen-
dent variable to the face value of whole life insurance.
The coeﬃcient on annual SSB is the coeﬃcient of interest for testing
this implication of the model. If the annuity oﬀsetm odel is correct, the
coeﬃcient should be signiﬁcantly positive. Looking ﬁrst at column (1), we
can see that this relationship does hold for total life insurance coverage in
the tobit speciﬁcation, with a coeﬃciento f0.48 that is highly signiﬁcant.
Using the well-known approximation that the marginal eﬀectcan obtained
by scaling the parameters by the probability in the uncensored region
yields a marginal eﬀecto fa nother dollar of SSB of approximately $0.22
of life insurance coverage. Column (2) repeats the analysis using OLS, and
ﬁnds a nearly identical marginal eﬀecto f0.22, though the large (White-
corrected) standard errors render this coeﬃcient insigniﬁcant.
We cant r anslate the life insurance face value into an annuity ﬂow by
dividing by the appropriate annuity factor, i.e., the actuarial present value
ofa$1.00 annuity ﬂow. Using a real interest rate of 3 percent, this factor
is approximately 10 for the average individual in the AHEAD sample.
Therefore, we ﬁnd that life insurance is oﬀsetting the ﬂow of SSB on the
margin by approximately 2.2 cents on the dollar. This oﬀset ism u c hl o w e r
than the 10–20 cent oﬀsetthat Bernheim found because the current sample
is of widows and widowers only, while Bernheim’s results were for a mixed
sample. Results for couples, discussed below, show a somewhat larger oﬀ-
set that falls in the lower end of the Bernheim oﬀset range.
Columns (3) through (6) of table 3.3 make the important distinction
between term and whole life insurance. Columns (3) and (4) report the























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.results for the case in which only term life insurance is treated as the de-
pendent variable. Relative to the results for columns (1) and (2), the
diﬀerence is striking. The tobit coeﬃcient falls to 0.04, and is statistically
no diﬀerent from zero. The tobit coeﬃcientf or SSB in the whole life insur-
ance speciﬁcation in column (5), on the other hand, is large and signiﬁ-
cant—the tobit coeﬃciento nSSB is 1.22 and is highly signiﬁcant. The
OLS results are again similar to the marginal eﬀects that arise out of the
tobit coeﬃcients, but are not signiﬁcant. It therefore appears, at least in
the sample of widows and widowers, that the central implication that SSB
will be positively correlated with term life insurance coverage does not
hold. While there is a signiﬁcant positive relationship found between total
life insurance coverage and Social Security in the tobit speciﬁcations, this
relationship appears to be driven more by whole life insurance than by
term coverage, and even this relationship is not always signiﬁcant.
As discussed by Bernheim and earlier in this paper, the annuity oﬀset
model is really a model about term life insurance. Yet the primary implica-
tion of this model, that term life insurance ownership will be an increasing
function of the level of SSB, is clearly rejected by the data. The relationship
between whole life insurance and Social Security, on the other hand, is
much stronger but subject to numerous sources of bias. As discussed, by
ages eventy, whole life insurance consists primarily of tax-advantaged sav-
ings, and therefore does not serve to undo annuitization any more than
holding other ﬁnancial assets. Since the individuals who have the most to
gain from the inside build-up associated with whole life policies are people
whow ere in higher tax brackets while younger (and who therefore are also
likely to have higher Social Security earnings), the observed relationship
may be driven more by tax consequences than by a desire to oﬀset a gov-
ernment annuity.
Table 3.4 repeats the analysis for the male widowers only, and ﬁnds a
similar pattern. In the speciﬁcation using total life insurance as the depen-
dent variable, there is a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of SSB in the tobit speci-
ﬁcation,a nd it is much larger in magnitude. Once again, however, when
we decompose total life insurance holdings into the two types, we ﬁnd that
the positive relationship is being driven entirely by whole life policies. The
OLS results again show similar, though insigniﬁcant, marginal eﬀects.
Table 3.5 repeats the same analysis for female widows. In this case, the co-
eﬃciento nSSB in the total life insurance regression falls short of signiﬁ-
cance, and is smaller in magnitude than for males. More importantly, the
coeﬃciento nSSB in the term life insurance speciﬁcations continues to be
small and insigniﬁcant. The only speciﬁcation in which the SSB coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcant is for the tobit speciﬁcation in the whole life insurance re-
gression.
Table 3.6 presents results for married couples. Focusing on column
(1), we again see that the coeﬃciento nSSB in the “total life insurance”


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.speciﬁcation is a positive and signiﬁcant 0.91. This oﬀseti ss imilar to what
Bernheim found, though at the lower end of his range. Once again, how-
ever, the split of total insurance into its two types yields dramatically dif-
ferent results. The coeﬃcientf or term insurance in column (2) is only 0.27,
and is not signiﬁcant at the 95 percent level. The coeﬃcient on SSB in the
whole insurance speciﬁcation (column [3]), on the other hand, is a signiﬁ-
cant 1.46. Repeating the analysis with OLS regressions, we again ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant correlation between SSB and life insurance ownership. As in
the case with widows and widowers, the signiﬁcant tobit results appear to
be driven primarily by a whole life insurance, not the term insurance that
the model is meantt or epresent.
Table 3.7 repeats the analysis on the subsample of married couples in
whichn either spouse is currently in the workforce. This distinction is quite
important, as even the tobit coeﬃciento nt o tal life insurance is no longer
signiﬁcant. There are two important reasons to think that working couples
may diﬀer from nonworking. First, an employed individual still has some
(albeit small) human capital to protect, just as a younger working-age in-
dividual does. Second, a worker is more likely to be covered by a group
insurance plan through the employer. In either case, if workers also have
higher Social Security beneﬁts because of a stronger attachment to the
labor force, this will induce a positive correlation between SSB and life in-
surance, even in the absence of a desire to undo annuitization.
Table 3.8 reports results similar to those in table 3.6, except that the de-
pendent variable is life insurance coverage on the husband only. The pat-
tern ofcoeﬃcients onSSB is similarto those foundin table 3. 6.Again, any
positive correlation is limited to the total or whole life speciﬁcations, and
is signiﬁcant only in the tobit speciﬁcations. Table 3.9 shows the results
for the sample of married women, and again we see the familiar pattern
of coeﬃcients.
In short, there is no evidence to suggest that term life insurance owner-
ship among retired elderly households exhibits the correlation with SSB
levels that the annuity oﬀsetm odel demands.
3.5.3 Test of Implication no. 3: Term Insurance as an Inferior Good
The third implication of the annuity oﬀsetm odel is that term life insur-
ance will behave as an inferior good with respect to lifetime resources. This
is simply because retirement consumption is viewed as a normal good, and
therefore the demand for annuities should be an increasing function of
resources. Since term insurance is to behave as a negative annuity, this
means that the demand for term insurance should be declining with total
lifetime resources.
Ia munable to replicate exactly Bernheim’s measure of lifetime re-
sources because access to Social Security earnings records is unavailable.
However, we can observe other components of resources, including the















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.actuarial present value of pensions, Social Security, housing wealth, and
ﬁnancial net worth. I construct the variable PVR to be the sum of these
resource variables. In addition, I am able to use indicator variables for ed-
ucation and occupation to proxy for lifetime earning eﬀects.
Using a measure of lifetime resources that included lifetime earnings
and the present value of pensions and Social Security, Bernheim found
mixed results in his test of this implication. Speciﬁcally, in his basic tobit
results, he found that the lifetime resource eﬀectw as negative for the aver-
age childless couple, but positive and insigniﬁcant for couples with chil-
dren. He ﬁnds better support for the notion that at least some portion of
total life insurance demand behaves as an inferior good by conducting re-
ﬁned estimates that model total life insurance holdings as the sum of two
distinct, but separately unidentiﬁed, processes. Based on these reﬁned esti-
mates, he concludes that the term part of total life insurance ownership is
the component that is behaving like an inferior good.
Looking at the coeﬃciento nPVR among widows and widowers (tables
3.3, 3.4, and 3.5) and among married couples (tables 3.6–3.9), we ﬁnd no
signiﬁcant relationship between PVR and term life insurance. While the
sign of the coeﬃcienti snegative in some of the term life insurance speciﬁ-
cations, it is not even approaching signiﬁcance at any standard level of
conﬁdence. The coeﬃciento nPVR in the whole life insurance speciﬁca-
tions, and as a result in some of the total life insurance speciﬁcations, is
strongly positive. This latter ﬁnding is consistent with Bernheim’s conclu-
sion that term and whole life insurance respond rather diﬀerently to varia-
tion in total resources. In the AHEAD data, however, there is no evidence
that term insurance is behaving like an inferior good.
3.5.4 Test of Implication no. 4: Term Insurance Owners
Consume Less than Social Security Income
Thef o urth and ﬁnal empirical implication of the annuity oﬀsetm odel
derives from the deﬁnition of being “over-annuitized” by Social Security.
Theb asic notion behind this model is that household bequest motives are
suﬃciently strong that their desired consumption level is less than the an-
nuityp rovided by Social Security, and that they would therefore prefer to
keep some of their wealth unannuitized in order to leave it to their heirs.
Conceptually, this is a straightforward implication to test, since it re-
quires the simple comparison of consumption to the income provided by
Social Security. If households consume more than the Social Security ben-
eﬁt, then they are not over-annuitized. However, this implication is diﬃcult
to test directly in the AHEAD data due to the fact that a good measure
of consumption is diﬃcult to construct with currently available data.
Therefore, I will rely on less direct methods to infer the extent to which
households wish to consume less than their Social Security income.
It is useful ﬁrst to consider a household’s dynamic budget constraint:
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where Wt represents ﬁnancial wealth at period t, Ct is consumption in
periodt, SSBt is the income ﬂow from Social Security, and Yt is the income
ﬂow from other (non–Social Security) sources. If it is true that individuals
areo ver-annuitized by Social Security, it must be the case that SSBt 
Ct.I fn ot, then the constraint of the mandated Social Security annuity is
nonbinding, and it need not be oﬀsetb ylife insurance. Since we do not
directly observe consumption in the AHEAD survey, this test must neces-
sarily be indirect. To be over-annuitized by Social Security requires SSBt
 Ct  0. This implies
(3) WW r Y tt t + −+ ≥ 1 1 ().
In other words, we need the amount of net saving done by households
to exceed the levels of non–Social Security income that they receive during
the period. That is, they must be saving some fraction of their Social Secu-
rity payments in addition to all non–Social Security income. According to
the annuity oﬀsetm odel, households that own term life insurance should
be saving all non–Social Security income, and then supplementing this be-
queathable saving with life insurance.
One simple way to test for this is to make use of a question asked in the
ﬁrst wave of the AHEAD survey:
Not counting any money or assets that you may have given children or
others, did you [and your (husband/wife/partner)] use up any of your
investments or savings during (1992/1993) to pay for expenses?
If households are spending down their existing nonannuitized assets in
order to pay for current consumption expenses, then they must be consum-
ing at least as much as their current total income, and therefore at least as
much as their Social Security income. Therefore, these individuals would
have no reason to hold life insurance.
Table 3.10 shows that approximately one-fourth of all households spent
down assets in 1992–93. Importantly, the overwhelming majority of these
households own life insurance, and in particular, term life insurance. In
fact, the proportion of those owning term life insurance who spent down
assets does not appear to be very diﬀerent from the proportion of those
noto wning term insurance who spent down assets, for both widows and
couples. Speciﬁcally, 24 percent of widows and 25 percent of couples who
own term life insurance engaged in a spend-down of ﬁnancial assets. This
test clearly understates the proportion of term life insurance owners who
arec o nsuming more than their SSB levels, as it does not account for con-
sumption out of non–Social Security income. If a person also has pension
or investment income, for example, the individual may consume in excess
of Social Security, and yet still be a net saver.
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All four of the major implications of the annuity oﬀsetm odel fail empir-
ical testing in the AHEAD data. As a result, it seems clear that this model
does note x plain life insurance behavior of elderly households. This leads
to the obvious next question, “What is the alternative hypothesis?” This is
the subject of the next section.
3.6 Alternative Explanations
There are a number of plausible alternative hypotheses that could ex-
plain why elderly individuals and couples hold life insurance. These alter-
natives share the common feature that none of them rely on the four empir-
ical implications of the annuity oﬀset model. That is, these hypotheses are
still quite plausible even knowing the results of section 3. 5. It is not the
goal of this paper to conduct a deﬁnitive test to select from among these
alternative hypotheses. I will, however, present some suggestive evidence
to provide direction for further research. The four alternative hypotheses
I discuss below include
1. Couple protection. Elderly couples use life insurance to insure against
loss of pension or Social Security beneﬁts upon the death of the ﬁrst
spouse.
2. Inertia. Life insurance holdings are simply “residue” from attempts
earlier in life to insure human capital.
3. Estate tax planning. Life insurance is used to assist with estate tax
planning (e.g., to provide liquidity) in wealthier households.
4. Funeral expenses. Many elderly view life insurance as their burial
money.
Table 3.10 Asset Spend-Down Versus Life Insurance Ownership (fraction
of population)
Own Any Own Term
Life Insurance? Life Insurance?
No Yes No Yes
Widows/Widowers
Spend-down?
No .383 .383 .516 .250
Yes .105 .128 .157 .078
Married Couples
Spend-down?
No .173 .590 .389 .371
Yes .047 .190 .115 .125
Source: Author’s tabulations from the AHEAD survey.
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The ﬁrst of these alternatives, the couple protection model, assumes that
married couples are purchasing life insurance in order to reallocate life-
contingent incomes. For example, suppose a husband has a pension plan
whichi sb eing paid out as a “joint and 50 percent contingent” annuity.
This type of annuity treats the spouses asymmetrically. If the wife dies
ﬁrst, the husband continues to receive the full beneﬁt. If the husband dies
ﬁrst, on the other hand, the pension income paid to the wife drops by 50
percent. If the couple decide that they would like to reallocate income
from the husband-only state to the wife-only state, one way to do this is
to purchase a term life insurance policy on the husband.
Thee vidence on this alternative is mixed. First, it cannot explain the
fact that 62 percent of widowers and 49 percent of widows hold life insur-
ance policies. Second, Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ (1987, 1989) tested this
model of couples using several data sets, including the RHS, and found
little support for the model’s implications. Speciﬁcally, they calculated the
decline in resources that a married individual would face upon the death
of his or her spouse, and used this variable as a predictor of life insurance
ownership on the spouse. They found that most households do not ade-
quately insure spouses against the potential resource loss associated with
widowhood.
On the other hand, 95 percent of husbands in the AHEAD sample who
own term life insurance name their spouses as the policy beneﬁciaries. If
the insurance is truly being held to leave as a bequest to children, there is
no obvious reason to leave the policy to the surviving spouse instead. Fur-
ther exploration of this alternative hypothesis is left for future research.
3.6.2 Inertia
Thes econd alternative hypothesis is that the elderly hold life insurance
while old only because they held it when they were young. This could
reﬂect irrational or rational behavior, as when an individual rationally
keeps a policy because it represents a good value from today forward. This
could be because the policy is already paid up, or because someone else is
paying for the policy (e.g., a child or a former employer). For example,
roughly 40 percent of the individuals in the AHEAD data who are covered
by a term life insurance policy are currently paying no premiums. Alterna-
tively, many have had a multiyear term policy with ﬂat or level premiums,
and therefore the policy is a better than actuarially fair deal from this time
forward because the individual has essentially prepaid.
There are also nonrational reasons that one might hold on to a policy
that was bought earlier in life. Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) provide
evidence of status quo bias in decision making. They point out that almost
every decision, such as an elderly individual’s decision about how much
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“maintaining one’s current or previous decision.” Using evidence from a
series of experiments, as well as data on retirement plan choice, they show
that individuals have a strong propensity to stick with the status quo. They
attribute this to the presence of “(1) . . . transition costs and/or uncer-
tainty; (2) cognitive misperceptions; and (3) psychological commitment
stemming from misperceived sunk costs, regret avoidance, or a drive for
consistency.”
There are several pieces of evidence that suggest inertia may aﬀect a
signiﬁcant fraction of the sample. First, data from LIMRA’s Life Insur-
ance Ownership Study indicates that most policies held by the elderly are
quiteo ld. When asked the age of the newest life insurance policy held, the
median response among those aged seventy and up was thirty-two years.
Them e dian age of the oldest policy was forty-two years. Fully 30 percent
of these elderly individuals bought their newest insurance policies before
the age of thirty, and have not purchased any additional insurance since
that time. Half of those owning insurance have not bought a policy since
the age of forty-three. It thus appears that the majority of policy owners
have not purchased any insurance for many decades, at least raising the
possibility that their continued ownership is due to a failure to cancel.
On the other hand, 17 percent of those who own life insurance bought
theirmostrecentpoliciessincetheageofsixty-ﬁve.AccordingtoaLIMRA
Buyer Study (1996), only 8 percent of all life insurance policies sold by
agents to individuals aged sixty-ﬁve and up were term policies. Most of the
rest were whole life policies, which are commonly used for estate planning
purposes. The average size of the policies sold to those aged sixty-ﬁve and
up was $92,800, with an annual premium of $4,698. These are quite large
policies compared to the average policy size found in the AHEAD data,
indicating that these individuals are likely to be wealthier than average
and more concerned with estate planning. While these households may
well be concerned about bequests, it is highly unlikely that they would be
purchasing large cash-value policies in order to oﬀset Social Security.
3.6.3 Estate Tax Planning
The third alternative hypothesis is that individuals hold life insurance
to aid in estate planning. There are several reasons that a wealthy house-
hold that would be subject to estate taxation upon death would use life
insurance as part of an estate planning strategy. First, the owners of a
family business may wish to provide heirs with suﬃcient liquidity to pay
for the estate taxes associated with the value of the business operation, in
order to avoid the need to liquidate business assets. Holtz-Eakin, Phillips,
and Rosen (1999) explore this point in detail. They ﬁnd that, other things
equal, business owners purchase more life insurance than other indi-
viduals.
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insurance as an eﬀective estate planning tool, this simply cannot explain
more than a small fraction of households in the AHEAD data. Fewer than
5p ercent of households in the data have a combined net worth and life
insurance face value in excess of $600,000, which was the point at which
the estate tax became an issue for households at the survey date.
3.6.4 Funeral Expenses
Thef o urth alternative hypothesis is that elderly individuals view life
insurance policies as their “burial money.” This could be a mental-
accounting approach to portfolio choice (Thaler 1985) or a rational way
to circumvent the probate process. Either way, this burial money notion
may explain the preponderance of small face value policies in the sample,
since according to the National Funeral Directors Association, the average
cost of a funeral in 1997 was $4,782. Hurd and Smith (this volume) show
that total out-of-pocket death expenses (which include out-of-pocket med-
ical and funeral expenses) for decedents in the AHEAD data average
$8,934. For comparison, the median amount of total life insurance cover-
agei s$5,000 among male widowers, $2,500 among female widows, $3,000
among married women, and $9,000 among married men. It seems reason-
able to suspect that many of these small policies are held for the purpose
of paying for ﬁnal death-related expenses. This notion is present inp o pular
ﬁnancial planning books as well. The author of one such book tells the
story of a conversation with a widow who asked him to review her ﬁnances.
She was ﬁnancially well oﬀ,w ithm ore than $600,000 in net worth and
annual living expenses of only $30,000. When he asked her why she was
carrying a term life insurance policy that was costing her several hundred
dollars a month in premiums, she replied, “That is to bury me” (Gardi-
ner 1997).
A LIMRA study conﬁrms that life insurance is frequently purchased
with the intention of using the proceeds to pay for one’s burial. Eighty-
three percent of widows report using the life insurance proceeds of
their deceased spouses primarily to pay for death-related expenses. The
LIMRA also reports that paying for death-related expenses is the most
commonly cited reason that consumers give for purchasing life insurance.
One reason that life insurance is a popular device for paying for death
expenses is that it avoids probate if paid to a named beneﬁciary (Graves
1994). Probate proceedings can tie up ordinary assets for many months,
so that family members are unable to use these assets to pay for funeral or
other death-related expenses. The proceeds from a small life insurance
policy, because it avoids the probate proceedings, can provide the dece-
dent’s family with timely access to funds with which to pay for these ex-
penses.
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Once we account for all the behavior that is directly inconsistent with
the annuity oﬀsetm odel or is potentially explained by alternative hypothe-
ses,w hat fraction of households exhibit behavior that can be explained
only by the desire to oﬀset annuities? A simple running tabulation pre-
sented in table 3.11 shows that it is likely to be a trivial fraction of the
population—far less than the 25 percent ﬁgure resulting from earlier
analyses.
Table 3.11 starts with the full population of widows and widowers in
the left-most column, and married men in the right. As the chart shows,
approximately half of all widows and 71 percent of married men own life
insurance policies. However, the annuity oﬀsetm odel is really a model of
term life insurance, which means we are really concerned about the 31.5
percent of widows and the 41.6 percent of married men who own term
policies. Next we can subtract those households which purchase a life an-
nuity, since these households would clearly not purchase life insurance to
oﬀset Social Security only to turn around and annuitize additional re-
sources. Ifwe follow Bernheim’s leadin treating life-contingentpension an-
nuities as a choice variable, we can further reduce the sample to only 17.7
percent of widows and 14.5 percent of married men.
Next, we can eliminate those households who are spending down their
ﬁnancial assets for consumption, since these individuals are also clearly
notc o nstrained by the Social Security income ﬂoor. At this point, we have
13.9 percent of widows and 10.7 percent of married men still in the pool.
Now let us account for individuals whose term life insurance coverage
costs them nothing. The reasoning here is that if an individual can receive
ap olicya tz ero marginal cost, then it is perfectly rational for him or her
Table 3.11 Determining Fraction of Sample Subject to Over-Annuitization Due to Bequests
Widows/Widowers (%) Married Men (%)
Full sample 100.0 100.0
Fraction holding any insurance 49.9 70.7
Fraction holding term insurance 31.5 41.6
Minus those purchasing private annuity 29.9 39.3
Minus those with private pension annuity 17.7 14.5
Minus those spending down ﬁnancial assets 13.9 10.7
Minus those with zero term premium 9.2 8.6
Minus those with term premium  0.5
actuarially fair 8.9 7.7
Minus those naming spouse as beneﬁciary — 0.8
Minus policies under $5,000 (funeral
expenses) 2.0 0.5
Source: Author’s tabulations from the AHEAD survey.
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since they do not have to use the Social Security beneﬁts to pay for the
premium, they are not oﬀsetting the annuity in any direct way. This leaves
us with 9.2 percent of widows and 8.6 percent of married men. Using
similar logic, we can eliminate those for whom the term premium is an
actuarially advantageous deal. Speciﬁcally, I exclude those whose term
premiums are less than half of the actuarially fair term premium of a
seventy-year-old in 1993.
Form arried couples, I eliminate those who name their spouses as the
beneﬁciaries, since such policies may be held more for spousal protection
than for bequest purposes. Finally, let us take the funeral expense notion
seriously, and assume that any policy with a face value of under $5,000 is
essentially the individual’s burial money. This reduces the sample to 2.0
percent of widows and 0.5 percent of married men.
Thec alculations in table 3.11 are meant to be illustrative only, and one
canc ertainly quibble with any one of the above exclusion restrictions.
These ﬁgures demonstrate, however, that one can explain away the ﬁnding
that individuals use life insurance to oﬀset Social Security. In short, with
af ew simple assumptions one can show that only a small fraction of house-
holds may be over-annuitized by Social Security because they have strong
bequest motives.
3.7 Summary and Future Directions
This paper has presented substantial evidence that the reason the elderly
hold life insurance is not to oﬀset mandated annuitization in the form of
Social Security in order to leave a bequest. Four empirical implications of
the annuity oﬀsetm odel were developed and tested, and all four were
found to be inconsistent with the behavior of elderly households in the
AHEAD data set.
This ﬁnding is relevant to the current debate over the future of the Social
Security system because it bears upon the question of whether mandatory
annuitization is desirable. Were it the case that a substantial fraction of
elderly households were over-annuitized by the existing Social Security
system due to the existence of strong bequest motives, this would be evi-
dence in favor of allowing choice over the annuitization decision. The re-
sults of this paper suggest that households are not over-annuitized by So-
cial Security for bequest reasons. Therefore, the simple fact that many
elderly households own term life insurance is not a suﬃcient reason to
argue against mandatory annuitization of retirement resources. This ﬁnd-
ing is consistent with the idea that annuities are of substantial value in the
retirement portfolios of elderly individuals (Mitchell et al. 1999; Brown
1999; Friedman and Warshawsky 1988). As a result, mandatory annuitiza-
tion may be desirable to overcome adverse selection in the annuity market.
122 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nHowever, this conclusion should be tempered by the acknowledgment that
individuals can be over-annuitized for reasons other than bequest motives,
as suggested in work by Hurd (1987, 1989).
This paper then suggests several alternative hypotheses for explaining
the large fraction of elderly households who own life insurance. While
these alternatives were not subjected to formal empirical testing in this
paper, informal evidence suggests that some of these alternatives may be
relevant. For example, the fact that the vast majority of policies have been
held for several decades suggests that many holdings may be due to inertia
from insurance decisions earlier in life. This would be consistent with the
“status quo bias” in decision making that has been documented by Sam-
uelson and Zeckhauser (1988), among others. It may also be the case that
many small policies are held as a method of prepaying death expenses,
such as funeral expenses.
It has also been found that the majority of policies held by married
individuals name the spouses as the beneﬁciaries rather than the children.
This is at least suggestive that the purpose of these policies may be to
provide an adequate consumption stream for a widowed spouse. While this
hypothesis found little support in earlier empirical work by Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ, those authors suggested that this might be due in part to the
poor quality of their data. Further investigation of these and other alterna-
tive hypotheses are left to futurer esearch.
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Comment Anne Case
This is a sensible, straightforward paper that answers some old questions,
and raises interesting new ones. Brown brings new data to an old ques-
tion—whether we can ﬁnd evidence of Social Security’s causing the elderly
to hold more annuities than they would otherwise choose, forcing them to
oﬀset their annuitization by purchasing life insurance. Using newly avail-
able data from the Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old
(AHEAD) survey, Brown ﬁnds no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
households are over-annuitized by Social Security.
Brown is able to revisit evidencep r esented in Bernheim (1991), evidence
that, according to Bernheim, “strongly suggests that an increase in Social
Security old-age insurance (OAI) beneﬁts tends to shift household re-
sources from a regime in which they obtain annuities from private sources
...and ultimately into a regime in which they purchase life insurance”
(900). The statistic often cited from the Bernheim paper is that for “more
Anne Case is professor of economics and public aﬀairs at Princeton University and a
research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
124 Jeﬀrey R.B r o w nthan one-fourth of all households, transfer motives are so strong that the
compulsory provision of annuities through Social Security actually re-
duces bequests below the ﬁrst-best levels” (900). As Brown lays out quite
coherently, there are many reasons that the Bernheim results may not be
robust. Bernheim, using the Retirement History Survey (RHS), did not
have the ability to separate term life insurance from whole life insurance,
and the latter often represents a tax-deferred savings instrument to wealth-
ier people. Even without details on data deﬁciency, the Bernheim results
seemr a ther implausible. The part of the income distribution most con-
cerned with bequests would be the part least likely to be over-annuitized
by Social Security. Social Security income represents only a small fraction
of consumption for wealthy households.
While Brown’s results seem reasonable in their totality, they are more
problematic in some of their details. In the conference version of the paper,
the results presented in the key tables had been estimatedu sing tobits. It
is highly likely that there will be heteroscedasticity in the unobservables in
the demand for life insurance equation, which would bias the coeﬃcient
estimates. Wealthy households have greater scope for idiosyncratic behav-
ior, and it would be surprising if we did not see a fanning out of the vari-
ance of unobservables with household income or wealth. In tables 3.3–3.9,
Brown presents results on the demand for whole life insurance, term life
insurance, and total life insurance for diﬀerent groups of interest (widow-
ers and widows, married couples, nonworking married couples). If the
variance of the unobservable component of the demand for insurance
diﬀered between these groups, or between whole and term insurance, then
we would expect to see diﬀerences in the Social Security beneﬁt (SSB)
coeﬃcient due to diﬀerences in the variances, and not necessarily due to
behavioral diﬀerences. (I think the next version of the paper will speak to
this, so there seems little point in belaboring it here.)
There are some puzzles in the results presented in tables 3.3–3.9. For
example, Brown suggests that because the coeﬃciento nw hole life insur-
ance is positive and signiﬁcant, while that on term insurance is smaller
and insigniﬁcant, that whole insurance is driving the relationship between
the level of SSB and life insurance that one ﬁnds when one looks at total
insurance and SSB. However, something here does not quite add up. Fifty-
sevenp ercent of married couples own whole life insurance, and 50 percent
own term insurance. Thus it would seem that one should ﬁnd the tobit
estimate of the eﬀecto fSSB on life insurance holdings for married couples
to be larger than either of the two estimates taken individually, all else
equal. That the eﬀecti ssmaller than that for whole insurance estimated
separately (0.91 in place of 1.46) suggests there are other forces at work
here, making it diﬃcult to state that whole insurance is driving the rela-
tionship between SSB and total life insurance.
There are many interesting ﬁndings in Brown’s results that he does not
Are the Elderly Really Over-Annuitized? 125discuss in the paper. For example, nonwhite widows appear to hold a good
deal of term life insurance. Why would this be the case? Are these women
living with children and grandchildren for whom they are the main pro-
viders?
The variable “Kids” is an indicator that the respondent has any living
children (although it is unclear why one would not use the number of living
children in these tables rather than an indicator variable). In tables 3.6
and 3.7, the “Kids” indicator is generally an insigniﬁcant predictor of life
insurance holdings. This seems surprising. I would have thought we would
see whole life insurance holdings respond to children.
In the term life insurance equations for the full sample of married cou-
ples, an indicator that the husband is working is not a signiﬁcant predictor
of holding term life insurance, while an indicator that the wife is working
is. What explains this? I would have thought term insurance was there to
protect the income ﬂow into the household upon the unexpected demise
of a working person. If, as is likely to be the case, a husband is earning
more than a wife, it would seem that that source of income would be more
likely to merit protection.
Thep aper promises that there will be a lot of interesting work ahead.
There is a need to examine life insurance in a coherent model. (Brown
mentioned at the conference that the saying in the business is that “life
insurance isn’t bought, it’s sold.” That seems an important part of the story
still to be incorporated.) Even for a conference of economists researching
aging, Brown spent two pages of his paper clarifying the diﬀerence be-
tween whole and term insurance. It seems both confusion and market im-
perfections may be worth modeling.
Finally, it seems the time has come to revisit the literature on spousal
(and family) protection. Some of the Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ work cited
analyzes data from the late 1960s. Much has changed—both in terms of
those savings mechanisms that are available and in use, and in terms of
the data available with which to analyze decisions made. It would seem an
ideal time to pursue this work.
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